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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






HELENA DUPONT WRIGHT; JAMES MILLS;  




ELTON CORPORATION; GREGORY FIELDS;  
FIRST REPUBLIC TRUST COMPANY OF DELAWARE LLC;  
M.C. DUPONT CLARK EMPLOYEES PENSION TRUST 
 
 
FIRST REPUBLIC TRUST COMPANY OF DELAWARE, LLC;  




JAMES B. WYETH, Solely as Executor and Personal Representative  
of the Estate of Phyllis M. Wyeth; MARY MILLS ABEL SMITH;  
CHRISTOPHER T. DUPONT; MICHAEL DUPONT; KATHERINE D. GAHAGAN 
 
 
     First Republic Trust Company of Delaware, LLC, 
                                  Appellant 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1:17-cv-00286) 
District Judge:  Hon. Joseph F. Bataillon 
______________ 
 




December 6, 2021 
______________ 
                                                                
Before: SHWARTZ, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 





SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 First Republic Trust Company of Delaware, LLC (the “Trustee”) appeals an order 
denying a motion to clarify a ruling that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., governs the Mary Chichester duPont Clark 
Employee Pension Trust (the “Trust”).  Because we do not have jurisdiction, we will 
dismiss this interlocutory appeal. 
I 
 The Trust was created to provide retirement benefits to household employees of 
the duPont family, including those working for Plaintiffs Helena duPont Wright and 
James Mills, the grandchildren of the Trust’s Settlor.   Plaintiffs sued the Trustee and 
other Trust administrators (collectively “Defendants”) alleging, among other things, that 
Defendants improperly operated the Trust and mishandled the Trust’s assets in violation 
of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).  The District Court bifurcated the case to determine 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 




first whether ERISA governed the Trust, then, if so, whether ERISA violations occurred.  
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the first issue and the Court 
held that ERISA governed the Trust because, inter alia, “there is a documented history of 
a multi-decade effort to provide pension benefits to the family’s long-term domestic 
employees.”  Wright v. Elton Corp. (“ERISA Order”), No. 17-CV-286, 2019 WL 
2344039, at *6 (D. Del. June 3, 2019).1 
The Trustee moved for clarification of the ERISA Order as to “whether the [o]rder 
requires [the Trustee] to currently operate and manage the Trust in accordance with the 
requirements of ERISA.”  App. 406.  The District Court denied the motion, explaining 
that the Trustee was “basically asking the Court to re-visit its previous rulings” and 
seemingly “attempting to abdicate any responsibility to operate the [T]rust in compliance 
with the law.”  Wright v. Elton Corp. (“Clarification Order”), No. 17-CV-286, 2020 WL 
7051549, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 27, 2020). 
The Trustee appeals the Clarification Order.   
 
 
1 Defendants also moved for entry of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) and certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b).  The District Court denied the motion, partially because “if [the ERISA Order] 
goes to the Third Circuit and the court agrees with this Court’s determination . . ., the 
Third Circuit would likely have to hear and decide this case more than once, since 
multiple remaining issues will need to be determined.”  Wright v. Elton Corp., No. 17-





 The Trustee, Wright, and Mills assert that we have jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because the Clarification Order 
grants an injunction that requires the Trustee to administer the Trust in compliance with 
ERISA.  We disagree. 
Section 1292(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that “courts of appeals shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals” from “[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United 
States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing 
to dissolve or modify injunctions.”  28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  An order grants an 
injunction when it is (1) “directed to a party,” (2) “enforceable by contempt,” and 
(3) “designed to accord or protect some or all of the substantive relief sought by a 
complaint in more than a temporary fashion.”  Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 
364 F.3d 106, 110 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Bd. of 
Trs. of the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey, 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 n.9 (3d Cir. 
1989) (en banc)).  Importantly, such an order must direct a party to engage or not engage 
in specific conduct.  See New Jersey State Nurses Ass’n v. Treacy, 834 F.2d 67, 70 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (“The [interlocutory] order does not contain the specificity one would expect 
in a final injunction and, on this record, we will not construe it as such.”); see also Hoots 
 
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and 28 




v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1350 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding no appellate jurisdiction 
when “[t]he guidelines supplied [in the interlocutory order] were mere generalities” and 
the interlocutory order “did not determine the nature, requirements, scope or extent of [] 
relief”); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 557 F.2d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir. 1977) (explaining that an 
interlocutory order containing “specific prohibited acts” warranted § 1292 appellate 
jurisdiction but an interlocutory order containing “only a skeletal outline for later 
adjudication” did not); cf. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974) (explaining that 
injunctions must be specific “to avoid the possible founding of a contempt citation on a 
decree [that is] too vague”).3 
 The Clarification Order does not satisfy these elements.  The Trustee concedes 
that the Clarification Order “does not instruct [the Trustee] regarding what it specifically 
is supposed to do.”4  Trustee Jurisdiction Br. at 5.  The order only addresses what the 
 
3 Because the parties argue that the Clarification Order grants (as opposed to 
denies) an injunction, an “irreparable consequences” inquiry is unnecessary.  See Saudi 
Basic, 364 F.3d at 111 (“[W]e have since recognized that . . . the showing of a ‘serious, 
perhaps irreparable consequence’ [is required] in the context of determining the 
appealability of an order denying injunctive relief[,] [but] [w]e have consistently refused 
to require such a showing of an enjoined party appealing an order granting an 
injunction.” (emphasis and citations omitted)). 
4 The parties rely on Saudi Basic, Harris, and Cohen to argue we have jurisdiction, 
but those cases involved interlocutory orders that directed a party to take specific actions.  
See Saudi Basic, 364 F.3d at 107, 110 (exercising § 1292 appellate jurisdiction over an 
order requiring that a party “fully comply with the terms of the [parties’ prior] 
Stipulation, [the terms of] which [we]re incorporated [] by reference,” including the 
requirement that the plaintiff halt using a specific manufacturing process  “until 
ownership rights to the[] [process] [were] established”); Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 




Court is not going to do.  Indeed, the opinion denying clarification simply makes clear 
that the District Court was declining “to re-visit its previous rulings.”  Clarification 
Order, 2020 WL 7051549, at *1.  The Court’s comment that the Trustee appears to be 
“attempting to abdicate any responsibility to operate the trust in compliance with the law” 
is hardly a call to action.  Id.  Thus, the Clarification Order (1) does not direct the Trustee 
(or any party) to take any specific action, (2) cannot be enforced by contempt, and 
(3) accords no substantive relief sought in the operative complaint.  Hence, it does not 
constitute an injunction.  See McNasby v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 832 F.2d 47, 50 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (holding a lack of appellate jurisdiction over a “district court’s [interlocutory] 
order [that] merely adopted the findings and conclusions previously entered”). 
Nor does the Clarification Order modify an injunction.  “For an interlocutory order 
to be appealable under § 1292(a)(1) as an order modifying an injunction,” (1) “the 
original or prior order must have been injunctive in character,” and (2) “that injunction 
must have been modified in some respect by the order from which the appeal has been 
taken.”  Hoots, 587 F.2d at 1348.  Thus, we must determine whether the ERISA Order 
was an injunction, and, if so, whether the Clarification Order modified that injunction. 
The ERISA Order was not an injunction.  The cross-motions for summary 
 
make available “250 treatment beds . . . and [fill its] facility [] to at least 90% (225 
residents) of capacity by July 15, 1991”); Cohen, 867 F.2d at 1468 (same, over an order 
“ordering the [defendant] University to restore [the plaintiff] to her [employment] 




judgment sought a determination regarding whether ERISA governed the Trust.  The 
District Court’s order granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied 
Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, holding only that “the Trust at issue 
[i]s an ERISA plan and is covered by ERISA.”  ERISA Order, 2019 WL 2344039, at *6.   
The parties sought only a decree concerning the governing law and an order setting forth 
such a general decree stating what law applies is not an injunction.  See Hoots, 587 F.2d 
at 1351 (explaining that a “step in a judicial proceeding leading to the formulation of [] 
relief” is not an injunction).  Moreover, the summary judgment motions did not seek an 
injunction, and the resulting order does not direct the Trustee (or any party) to take any 
specific action or provide any specific remedy.  While the order may afford some relief 
sought in the operative complaint, namely a declaratory judgment that ERISA governs 
the Trust, the order does not resolve the complaint’s other substantive claims. 
Furthermore, the District Court has not yet decided whether Defendants violated 
ERISA.  See Taylor v. Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 288 F.2d 600, 604 
(2d Cir. 1961) (“If the District Judge had said in his opinion only that a further hearing 
would be held at which the parties would have an opportunity to express themselves as to 
relief, by testimony, argument, or both, it would be entirely plain that he had not granted 
a[n] [] injunction . . . .”)  Although failure to comply with ERISA could subject 
Defendants to liability, liability is not the same as contempt.  See Santana Prod., Inc. v. 




“may be liable in damages” for continuing conduct “during the course of the litigation 
without risk of being held in contempt”).  Thus, the ERISA Order was not an injunction. 
Even if the ERISA Order was an injunction, the Clarification Order does not 
modify it.  As we previously explained, the Clarification Order declined to make any 
changes to the ERISA Order.  Because the Clarification Order does not modify the 
ERISA Order, § 1292’s modification language would not apply.  See New Jersey State 
Nurses Ass’n, 834 F.2d at 70 (lacking appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order 
that “did [not] grant any additional relief beyond that granted in [the original 
injunction]”). 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this appeal of the District Court’s 
Clarification Order.5 
 
5 We will also dismiss as moot the motion to strike Third-Party Defendant 
Appellees’ brief.  
